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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DELIVERY OF A KEY TO LINDA THOMAS
DID NOT CONSTITUTE DELIVERY OF THE
DEED.
Throughout the Trial, counsel for Linda Thomas took the position that
the signing of the Deed and the giving of copies of the Deed to Linda Thomas
and Connie Rowan constituted delivery. It appears from Appellee's brief, that
the focus has now shifted to the delivery of a key to the Mr. Jackson's safety
deposit box has in some way constituted delivery of the deed. In Point III of
Appellant's original brief, the text of Linda Thomas' testimony is set out
verbatim but in short, Linda Thomas testified that she was uncertain when the
key was delivered to her but when asked whether it was longer than one year,
she indicated no and when asked whether it was within two months, she said
she could not really say (record 59, page 27, line 17- page 28, line 4). When
asked regarding the reason she was given a key and what discussions were had
between her and her father regarding the purpose for giving her a key, she
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stated, "He showed me where he keeps the keys and he just said, I lose a lot of
keys so here is a copy." (R59 P25 lines 1, 2) Mr. Jackson did not say anything
with regard to her ability to get into the safety deposit box; did not discuss the
contents of the safety deposit box; nor did he even make mention of the Deed
at the time the key was given to Linda Thomas, (see R59, P 24, L 19 - P25,
L13).
It is apparent from Linda Thomas' own testimony that there was no
expression of intent to deliver the Deed in conjunction with the giving of the
key but rather only an explanation that "I lose a lot of keys so here's a copy."
(R59 P.25 lines 1,2,)
Ms. Thomas cites in her Brief Agrelius v. Mohesky, 494 P.2d 1095
(Kansas 1972) for the proposition that the delivery of a key constitutes delivery
of the deed. The Court in its own opinion clearly stated that the mere giving of
a key is not sufficient to constitute delivery of the Deed.
It may be conceded that the act of placing an executed Deed
in a safety deposit box, to which the grantor has the sole or one of
several keys, is not sufficient of itself to evidence the delivery of a
deed. However, when such action is coupled with other evidence
4

disclosing an intent to deliver a present title, a sufficient showing
of delivery may be made out. (Emphasis added) Id. at 1101.

The background in Agrelius contained a situation in which mom and dad
executed two deeds on the same day each conveying an 80 acre farm to each of
their two sons Clair and Kenneth. The Court then went on to state:
On a subsequent occasion in 1944, Mr. Agrelius told Clair
of the deeds, handed him a key to the safety deposit box and said,
according to Clair, that the deed was in the locked box and that
"WW Parker told him that that constituted delivery of the deed to
me." Clair first saw the deeds in 1962 at the time of his father's
death, but did not remove them from the box until after his
mother's death in 1967, at which time he took them to be
recorded.
The Trial Court held that delivery of both the deeds was
effected at the time Claire was handed the key. The question
before us is whether the court, under all the facts and
circumstances, was justified in drawing the inference that the
deeds were delivered during the grantor's lives... Id. at 1101
The Court then concluded that the delivery of the key with the
expression of intent by the grantor constituted delivery of the deed. The facts
in Agrelius are much different from the facts at hand.
According to Linda Thomas' testimony, there was no discussion with
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regard to the deed when Mr. Jackson supposedly gave her the key. Linda
Thomas' own testimony was that Mr. Jackson was giving her the key in case
Mr. Jackson's key was lost.
As pointed out by the Trial Court, Linda Thomas had the burden of proof
of showing that delivery of the deed occurred. The mere giving of a key to her
for safe keeping falls far short of a delivery of the deed. Even if Linda Thomas
possessed a key to the safety deposit box during the life of Mr. Jackson it did
not mean that the bank would provide her access to the safety deposit box.
Linda Thomas who has the burden of proof did not provide any evidence at
Trial that she was one of the lessee's on the safety deposit box at the bank. It is
clear from her testimony, however, that she never accessed the safety deposit
box during the life of Mr. Jackson nor was she ever instructed by Mr. Jackson
to access the safety deposit box and obtain the deed.
POINT II
ONE WHO ASSERTS AN INTER VIVOS GIFT
FROM A DECEASED'S ESTATE MUST SHOW
THAT INTENTION BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
6

Ms. Thomas in her brief cites Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 286
P.63 8 (Utah 1930) for the proposition that the giving of a key constitutes
delivery. The Utah Supreme Court case in Christensen does not further Ms.
Thomas' position.
In Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, the Supreme Court was called upon
to make a determination of whether a delivery had occurred of a passbook
savings account. Although the Court in Christensen did not involve the
transfer of a deed of real estate, the principles outlined with regard to the
establishment of an inter vivos gift are instructive to this Court.
In Christensen, Jens Christensen was the owner of a savings account at
Ogden State Bank. The ownership of the account was documented in the
ledgers at the Bank and evidenced by a passbook which showed the deposits
and withdrawals from the savings account. Mr. Christensen during his lifetime
signed a card transferring the name designation on the account to read, "Jens
Christensen, book #25695, 2877 Grant Avenue, City or Antone Christensen
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payable to either or survivor." Id. 640. The passbook was never given to
Antone Christensen but was held in the safety deposit box.
Antone Christensen asserted the position that since the records of the
bank reflected ownership in himself as well as Jens Christensen that he should
be entitled to the savings account. The Ogden State Bank and Jens
Christensen's widow asserted the position that since the passbook was not
physically transferred or given to Antone Christensen that the inter vivos gift
was incomplete.
The Court determined that since the passbook was not delivered to
Antone Christensen that it was not a completed gift and ruled in favor of
Ogden State Bank and Jens Christensen's widow, thus reversing the decision of
the trial court. The Court stated as follows with regard to the requirements of a
gift:
When the claim of a gift is not asserted until after the death
of the alleged donor, it should be sustained by clear and
satisfactory evidence of every element which is requisite to
constitute a gift. Robinson v. Bank, supra.
He who attempts to establish title to property through a gift
inter vivos as against the estate of a decedent, takes upon himself a
8

heavy burden, which he must support by evidence of great
probative force which clearly establishes every element of a valid
gift, - that the decedent intended to divest himself of the title in
favor of the donee, and accompanied his intent by delivery of the
subject matter of the gift. Matter of O'ConnelK supra.
Mindful of the facility with which, after the alleged donor is
dead, fraudulent claims of ownership may be founded on
pretended gifts of his property asserted to have been made while
he was living, it is a but a salutary precaution which demands
explicit and convincing evidence of every element needed to
constitute a valid donation, whether it be a donation inter vivos or
mortis causa. Even then fraudulent claims may prevail. But the
rigid requirement of the clearest proof will at least diminish the
number. Waylen v. Milhollen, Supra.
It is an elementary rule of law that in gifts inter vivos as
well as gifts causa mortis the title to the thing given must pass
from the donor to the donee. In contemplation of the law there
must be no executory gift...
... If the decedent intended that the title to the savings
account, should, during his life, pass to Plaintiff, it is difficult to
understand why the deceased did not deliver the key to the safety
deposit box to his brother or perform some other act calculated to
make it possible for him to get possession of the passbook.
Likewise, if the deceased intended to part with title to the account,
it is difficult to understand why he should have worried about the
paper that he had signed while at the hospital and to entertain the
hope that he would fool those who were trying to get his money.
While there may be circumstances which will support a gift or
voluntary trust in a savings deposit account in the absence of
delivery of the passbook and in the absence of the changing of the
names of the persons to whom the passbook is issued, we are of
the opinion that record in this case does not justify sustaining the
9

claim of Plaintiff to the savings deposit account upon either of
Plaintiffs theories. As we review this record, we are forced to the
conclusion that the deceased intended that the Title to the same in
his account should remain in himself until his death. Id. 643, 644.
As set out in Christensen cited by Appellee, the court was unwilling to
find an inter vivos gift based upon the facts of that case, and consequently
reversed the Trial Court.
The final case cited by Ms. Thomas is Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351
(Utah 1979) the Court sets out the standard as follows:
The rule is well settled that a deed, to be operative as a
transfer of the ownership of land, or an interest or estate, therein
must be delivered. It was equally settled in this and the vast
majority of jurisdictions that a valid delivery of a deed requires
that it pass beyond the control or domain of the grantor. The
requisite relinquishment or control or dominion over the deed may
be established, notwithstanding the fact that the deed is in
possession of the grantor at her death, by proof of facts which tend
to show delivery had been made with the intention to pass title and
to explain the grantor's subsequent possession. However, in order
for delivery effectively to transfer title, the grantor must part with
possession of the deed or the right to retain it. Id. at 1352.
Ms. Thomas makes no effort to attempt to explain why there may have
been a valid delivery even though Mr. Jackson retained possession of the deed.
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Linda Thomas' own testimony stated that there was no discussion with regard
to the deed when she supposedly received the key, but rather only that she was
given the key because her father stated that he loses keys.

CONCLUSION
If one takes all of the facts as testified to by Linda Thomas and Connie
Rowan from the time that the Deed itself was signed until Mr. Jackson's death,
one cannot say that Mr. Jackson ever allowed the Deed to be taken out of his
possession or ever gave up his right to retain it. The Deed was signed at First
Security Bank and notarized after which Mr. Jackson physically carried the
Deed from First Security Bank back to Mr. Coxson's law office. Mr. Jackson
allowed Mr. Coxson to make copies and give copies to his daughters Connie
Rowan and Linda Thomas, but then retained the original Deed in his
possession. When invited by his attorney to allow the attorney to record the
Deed, Mr. Jackson declined. When instructed by Mr. Coxson that the Deed
must be recorded in order to complete the transaction, again Mr. Jackson
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declined to record the Deed. Mr. Jackson, Connie Rowan, and Linda Thomas,
then left the law office with again Mr. Jackson physically retaining the Deed in
his personal possession; they dropped Linda Thomas off at her house and then
Mr. Jackson and Connie Rowan traveled to Central Bank in Springville, Utah,
where Mr. Jackson placed the Deed in a safety deposit box for safe keeping.
Neither Connie Rowan nor Linda Thomas had access to the safety deposit box
when the Deed was placed in it. According to Linda Thomas at a later date
somewhere between two months and one year later, she was given a key to the
safety deposit box with an explanation that Mr. Jackson loses keys and so he
was giving her a copy. At the time of Mr. Jackson's death, the Deed was
retrieved from the safety deposit box.
Based upon the foregoing there is certainly not clear and convincing
evidence of Mr. Jackson's intent to deliver the Deed or to relinquish his
possession of it.
The only clear intent on Mr. Jackson's part comes from his testamentary
expression which were in writing in the Codicil wherein he specifically sets out
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nominal amounts to be paid to Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan and the
remainder of the house to be given to his wife Maria Jackson.
It is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the decision of the
District Court in finding that there was not a delivery of the Deed and that the
home should pass according to Mr. Jackson's testamentary desires as set out in
his Codicil to his Will.
DATED this J ^ _ day of April, 2001.
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